(52aw) Strengthening Regulatory Oversight of Declining Safety Performance

Regardless of the system of regulation, the regulator has the responsibility for independently assuring that major hazard facilities are operated safely. In addition to enforcing regulations, one of the most important tasks carried out by a regulator is the systematic assessment of the Operator’s safety performance. This allows the regulator to detect early signs of declining safety performance, identify underlying latent weaknesses and make timely interventions before it is too late and a serious incident ensues.

The implementation of this function usually represents an ambitious undertaking for any regulator in the world and can be an unattainable goal for new major hazard safety regulators operating where the infrastructure, including the development of a strong regulatory body, may not be as advanced as in countries with established major hazard state regulatory frameworks. This is because while traditional technical competence and regulatory methods (e.g. inspection) may be sufficient to identify, analyse and correct technical and procedural safety deviations and unsafe acts at workplace these tools are usually insufficient to assess underlying organizational factors that are thought to give rise to the identified deviations. The situation is compounded by the fact that the availability of experienced personnel is scarce.

This paper provides recommendations to new major hazard safety regulators regarding the manner in which regulatory oversight of an operator’s safety performance should be integrated in the regulator’s management system as a Core Regulatory Function called ’Systematic Analysis of Safety Performance’, supported by staff with specific competence in Human and Organizational Factors (HOFs). The ‘Analysis’ function covers the entire spectrum of assessment tasks carried out by the regulatory staff to: a) detect declining safety performance, b) diagnose latent weaknesses (root causes) and c) make effective safety culture interventions.

The paper suggests a ‘5 x 5’ organizational structure, which encompasses 5 Core Regulatory Functions (CRFs) supported by 5 Core Technical areas. This organizational structure should ensure the effective execution of the Operator’s Safety Performance Oversight while also ensuring the necessary interaction with the remaining core and supporting functions to allow the Regulator to perform all its regulatory functions in an effective and efficient manner.