(43g) Risk Analysis for Pressure Relief Devices – Managing Plant Safety and Reliability | AIChE

(43g) Risk Analysis for Pressure Relief Devices – Managing Plant Safety and Reliability



Risk Analysis for Pressure relief
devices ? Managing Plant Safety and Reliability

Pressure relief devices are one of the most critical
assets for plant risk and safety, therefore it is essential to be able to
ensure PSV's operation, reliability and availability through the implementation
of risk mitigation or prevention actions, either, corrective, preventive or
predictive; these actions will allow plant owners to manage the risk associated
with the device operation (or failure). This paper is intended to show a risk
assessment using Weibull analysis focused on the identification for risk
reduction opportunities and the selection for the best chance and dates to
implement risk mitigation actions. Risk assessment methodology is based on API
RP 581, Risk Based Technology.

Historically, maintenance planning for a PSV was
carried out, based on pressure tests and engineering judgment; a pressure (POP)
test is usually conducted to evaluate device's availability and functional
condition and its frequency is linked to the protected equipment's maintenance
program, regardless whatever the failure mode. Nevertheless, now a days, more
quantitative and rigorous methodologies are required not just for maintenance
planning but for developing a risk management strategy.

The methodology is a risk assessment. We evaluate
the probability of failure (POF) times the consequence of failure (COF), for
both, a valve failure and a protected equipment failure. Two failure modes are
evaluated: fail to open on demand (FOD) and leak (LEAK). POF is calculated
analyzing three main issues:

1.      Historical
inspection records and time in service, using a two parameters Weibull distribution,
as follows:

                                                                 (1)

2.      Probability
of failure from the protected assets,

                                                                             (2)

3.      Probability
of failure from process over pressure scenarios.

                                                             (3)

Consequences of failure (FOD, LEAK) are evaluated as
a function of consequence area and as a function of its economic impact, for a
valve failure and for a protected equipment failure.

FOD consequences are evaluated for four leak
scenarios (1/4?, 1?, 4? and catastrophic rupture) for each protected equipment
and using an overpressure as the discharge pressure. This overpressure is a
higher pressure than the normal operating conditions. In this approach impact
zones are used to evaluate fire, explosion and toxicity effects, in the same
way we do it for a traditional quantitative consequence analysis. Meanwhile, for
the leak failure mode, consequences are evaluated using a financial approach,
no impact area is considered. Consequences categories for the leak mode are as
follows:

·        
Loss of production costs

·        
Maintenance cost (repair costs)

·        
Product costs

The leak mode includes both, a small leak and a
moderate leak. Moderate leak means valve stuck open, while small leak means leakage
past valve (No seal).

Therefore, the global risk is calculated using the
two risks approaches,

                                           (4)

Risk calculation involves a straightforward review
of the process operating conditions using a layer of protection analysis
(LOPA), it also requires analyzing the process conditions and initiating events
than can challenge or demand the PSV and the layers affecting the initiating
event frequency. The methodology also involves a process for evaluate as many overpressure
scenarios as possible; this scenarios will also challenge the pressure relief
device.

This risk analysis methodology has the following benefits:

a)      Perform
a What if?? Scenarios analysis, and evaluate risk mitigation actions

b)      Update
analysis modeling, using new data

c)      Understanding
risk drivers

d)     Understanding
event sequence for risk contributors

e)      Set
up a risk management strategy

The risk assessment was performed for 100 PSV,
located on several offshore facilities. Results show risk contribution for
every failure mode, risk ranking for the whole set of PSVs, new maintenance
dates as well as reliability and availability estimations. The use of this
approach is very useful, because we are able to deal with large data samples
and also fits well with small data samples. Results can be expressed using
failure mode information or time to failure information.