Tying-It All Together

Many facilities view process safety as a collection of elements and treat them independently. Process Hazard Analyses are conducted independent of safe upper and lower limits or operating limits. Management of Change procedures are written independent of the Mechanical Integrity program. Sometimes various process safety functions are performed by different departments within an organization without sufficient consultation. For example, alarm rationalization may be headed up by the control systems engineering department while operating limits are being set separately by Operations and Process Engineering. This leads to inefficiencies in implementing a process safety program. It can also lead to conflicting data and confusion within the organization.

The purpose of this presentation is to outline ways to tie various elements of a process safety program together into an integrated system. The relationship between operating limits, the various phases of operating procedures, and safe upper and lower limits will be described. Tying alarm rationalization into this mix will be discussed. The relationship between the safety systems description requirement under Process Safety Information and the safety systems description requirement under Operating Procedures will also be discussed. By using some of the techniques presented, a more integrated process safety program may be achieved.